

Supplementary Appendix Material:

Understanding the linkages between social safety nets and childhood violence: A review of the evidence from low- and middle-income countries

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APPENDIX A. OECD PAPERS (PROGRAM COMPONENTS)										
No	Authors	Country	Program name	Implementer	Modality	Target population	Recipient	Program details	Benefits	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	Size	Regularity
									(9)	(10)
1	Morris & Michalopoulos (2003) [‡]	Canada (New Brunswick & British Columbia)	Self-Sufficiency Project (SSP)	Vinge and Associates Ltd. (British Columbia); Family Services Saint John, Inc. (New Brunswick)	CfW Plus	Single-parents on welfare (≥1 year)	Welfare recipients (single-parents)	Demonstration project offering a temporary (max. 3 years) earnings supplement to parents leaving welfare and working ≥30 hours a week, irrespective of HH composition ¹ . Supplement roughly equal to 50% of the difference between actual and target level earnings (target levels: Can\$ 30,000 in New Brunswick and Can\$ 37,000 in British Columbia in 1994).	Earnings supplement: Can\$ 250-585	Monthly
2	Jacob et al. (2013) [‡]	USA (Chicago)	Moving to Opportunity (MTO)	Department of Housing & Urban Development	Housing vouchers	Low-income HH with children in public housing in high-poverty census tracts	HHs	Vouchers subsidize housing in the private market at a rate equal to the difference in 'fair market rent', depending on metropolitan area, HH income and HH size. After receiving the voucher, HHs had 3-6 months to find an apartment. No special restrictions placed on location.	USD 8,000 (average subsidy value). Approx. 30% of HH income.	Annual
3	Bloom et al. (2002) [†]	USA (Connecticut)	Jobs First	Connecticut Department of Social Services	CfW Plus	Low-income HHs on welfare	Welfare recipients	Main features of Jobs First: 1. Time limit on cash benefits at 21 months, unless granted an exemption or an extension 2. Full earnings disregard as long as earned income falls below the federal poverty line 3. Requirements to participate in employment-based services	Parent with 2 children earning USD 6.25 per hour: 40 hours/week: USD 688 20 hours/week: USD 364	Monthly
4	Fein & Lee (2003) [‡]	USA (Delaware)	A Better Chance Welfare Reform Program (ABC)	Delaware's Division of Social Services (Govt)	CfW Plus	Single-parent HHs	Primary caregivers	Employment services (job search, job retention, workfare activities) and financial incentives (tax breaks, expanded health insurance, child care coverage), conditional on working in a workfare job on a pay-after-performance basis with strict noncompliance penalties. ² ABC also contains a series of provisions stressing parenting and other responsibilities. ³	NR	NR
5	Bloom et al. (2000) [†]	USA (Florida)	Family Transition Program (FTP)	Florida Department of Children & Families (Govt)	CfW Plus	Low-income HHs on welfare	Welfare recipients (single-parents)	Key features of FTP: 1. Time limit on cash assistance (24/60 months for most recipients and 36/72 months for the least job-ready) 2. Financial work incentives (higher earnings disregard, higher asset limit for cash assistance, longer child care assistance when leaving welfare to work) 3. Enhanced services and requirements (case management, referral to other benefits and requirements around employment-based services) 4. Parental responsibility mandates (requirements around school attendance and child immunization) Failure to meet employment-based requirements and/or parental responsibility mandates leads to sanctions (grants cancelled or reduced).	Parent with 2 children earning USD 5.15/hour: 30 hours/week: USD 37 20 hours/week: USD 99	Monthly
6	Beecroft et al. (2002) [†]	USA (Indiana)	Indiana Welfare Reform	Division of Family & Children in Indiana's Family & Social Services Administration (Govt)	CfW Plus	Low-income HH with children <19 years	Primary caregivers	Key features of Indiana Welfare Reform: 1. Income eligibility ceiling ("zero grant" policy involving retention of Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) (and thereby Medicaid) eligibility as long as income is below the federal poverty line) 2. Work requirements (monitored) and sanctions (enforced) 3. Time limit (24-month lifetime limit for eligible adults, benefits for children continue indefinitely) 4. Family cap and personal responsibility requirements (no increase for children born ≥10 months after start of benefits; and requirements around child immunization, school attendance, quality of the home environment, and parental illegal drug use - Sanction of USD 90 a month until compliance).	NR	NR

APPENDIX A. OECD PAPERS (PROGRAM COMPONENTS) (continued)										
No	Authors	Country	Program name	Implementer	Modality	Target population	Recipient	Program details	Benefits	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	Size	Regularity
									(9)	(10)
7	Huston et al. (2008)†	USA (Milwaukee)	New Hope Project	New Hope Project, Inc.	CfW Plus	Low-income adults (income threshold)	Low-income working adults	Package of benefits available for 3 years: 1. Job search assistance, including referral to time-limited community service jobs for those unable to find market-based employment 2. Earnings supplement 3. Subsidized child-care for parents with children aged <13 4. Subsidized health insurance Benefits conditional on full-time work (≥30 hours a week). Earnings supplements adjusted upward for HH size (max. 2 adults and 4 children). Other financial benefits—health insurance and child care—extended to all eligible HH members, regardless of HH size.	Earnings supplement: USD 120	Monthly
8	Gennetian & Miller (2002)‡	USA (Minnesota)	Minnesota Family Investment Program (MFIP)	Minnesota Department of Human Services (Govt)	CfW Plus	Low-income HHs on welfare	Welfare recipients (single-parents)	Main features of MFIP: 1. Requirements to work or participate in employment-focused services 2. Financial incentives for either full- or part-time work (higher basic benefits and earnings disregard) 3. Child-care expenses paid directly to service providers (rather than reimbursement of recipients) 4. Simplified public assistance rules for program synergies Families randomly assigned to MFIP or Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) (traditional welfare) to test effects of employment mandate, urban counties were assigned to a third group (MFIP Incentives Only)	Financial incentives: USD 150-250	Monthly
9	Cancian et al. (2013)‡	USA (Wisconsin)	Wisconsin Works (W-2) & Wisconsin Child Support Program ⁴	Wisconsin Department of Children & Families (Govt)	CfW Plus & UCT	Low-income HH with children <19 years	Primary caregivers	Beneficiaries assigned to different tiers based on work history and employment barriers. Upper tier placements involve case management services (no cash stipend). Lower tiers involve a cash stipend where beneficiaries are assigned to one category: 1. Community service jobs (benefits reduced for each hour of mandated activities missed); 2. Transitions tier (for beneficiaries with barriers to employment); 3. Newborn support (mothers of children <12 weeks). Among those receiving W-2 benefits, subgroup randomized into full pass-through and disregard of child support (assignment only affected income if W-2 benefits and child support received in the same month).	Community service jobs (full): USD 673 W-2 transitions/ caretaker of newborn: USD 628 Full pass-through & disregard of child support: USD 101-102 (USD 180-174 if child support order at assignment)	Monthly
Notes: ‡ refers to peer-reviewed journal article; † refers to working paper or technical report										
Abbreviations: CfW = cash for work; HH = household; NR = Not reported; UCT = unconditional cash transfer; USD = United States dollar; Can\$ = Canadian dollar.										
1	SSP supplement only available to those who found full-time work within 12 months of entering the study.									
2	Noncompliance results in a 2-month, 1/3 grant reduction at the first instance; a 2-month, 2/3 reduction at the second instance; and permanent case closure upon the third instance. After 48 months, HHs become ineligible for further cash assistance, though may request up to two 6-month extensions. DSS staff monitor compliance and apply sanctions accordingly; which escalate with continued noncompliance and lead to case closure within 6 months.									
3	Including child immunization and attendance standards, parenting classes, a health clinic visit to obtain family planning information, and substance abuse treatment (when needed).									
4	A unique feature of W-2 was a full pass-through and disregard of child support paid on behalf of HHs receiving W-2 benefits. As the policy required a federal waiver, the federal government required a randomized controlled trial to evaluate impact (through the Child Support Demonstration Evaluation 1997-98). Hence, two programs are relevant to the study, though information reported here focuses on W-2 as the entry program.									

APPENDIX A. OECD PAPERS (EVALUATION COMPONENTS)

No	Authors	Study design	Data (years)	Sample (size)	Violence outcome	Measure(s)	BL Mean	Measure of effect(s)	Hypothesized mechanism
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
1	Morris & Michalopoulos (2003) [‡]	Individual RCT (exp.)	Demographic data at BL (1992/95), state administrative records, & primary data collection in New Brunswick & British Columbia at 36-months follow-up (1995/98).	3,259 single parents (1,654 T; 1,605 C) with 5,078 children aged 3-18 at follow-up (2,582 T; 2,496 C)	Violent discipline	Negative parenting (children aged 15-18) ¹	2.16 [#]	OLS: 0.08*	Two primary pathways hypothesized: i) employment and income affect available material and non-material resources which can influence children's development; ii) increased income may reduce parental stress which can influence the parent-child relationship.
						Negative parenting (children aged 12-18)	2.39 [#]	OLS: -0.05 (NS)	
2	Jacob et al. (2013) [‡]	HH-level RCT (nat. exp.)	Voucher application forms & administrative records from Illinois Department of Human Services; Mortality records from National Death Index (NDI) (1997 - 2009)	11,680 children ≤18 living in public housing at baseline (2,487 T; 9,189 C)	Homicide (per 100,000 individuals aged <18 years)	Homicide	14.6	OR: 1.07 (95% CI 0.60-1.79)	Suggests that an important risk/protective factor to health outcomes of young children involves the physical/institutional environment and its effect on parental behavior. Suggests that for older children and adolescents, their own behavior is increasingly important in determining health outcomes (influenced by "neighborhood effects").
						Homicide (males)	25.9	OR: 1.11 (95% CI 0.61-1.90)	
						Homicide (females)	3.1	OR: 0.69 (95% CI 0.03-4.15)	
3	Bloom et al. (2002) [†]	Individual RCT (exp.)	Demographic data at BL (1996/97), state administrative records and primary data collection in Manchester and New Haven at 3-year follow-up (1999/2000)	1,469 single-parents with children aged 5-12 at follow-up (one RS per HH)	Violent discipline	Harsh parenting ² (full sample)	1.7 [#]	OLS: -0.1**	Suggests that earnings disregard, time limits, services and requirements may directly affect parental economic outcomes, which, in turn, may affect intermediate outcomes (resources and the home environment, parent-child relationship and family functioning). Authors hypothesize that the "message" such program components convey may directly affect parental functioning, and, in turn, children's outcomes.
						Harsh parenting (least disadvantaged)	1.7 [#]	OLS: 0.0 (NS)	
						Harsh parenting (moderately disadvantaged)	1.7 [#]	OLS: -0.1**	
						Harsh parenting (most disadvantaged)	1.7 [#]	OLS: 0.0 (NS)	
						Harsh parenting (children aged 5-9)	1.8 [#]	OLS: -0.1 (NS)	
						Harsh parenting (children aged 9-12)	1.7 [#]	OLS: -0.1*	
4	Fein & Lee (2003) [‡]	Individual RCT (nat. exp.)	Administrative data from Delaware's Family & Child Tracking System (FACTS) matched to IDs for welfare children (10/1995 - 09/1998) ³	3,959 single-parent cases in 5 pilot offices who entered ABC between Oct 1995 & Sept 1996 (2,138 T; 1,821 C ^d)	Sexual abuse	Sexual abuse (substantiated)	NA	Mean: 0.006 (T), 0.006 (C) (NS)	Two principal channels hypothesized: parents' psychosocial wellbeing, and the quantity and quality of adult supervision. Main pathways: i. Increased employment: May lead to increased income and self-esteem, reducing stresses leading to abusive behavior. May also increase stress and leave children without adequate supervision. Whether the balance is favorable or not depends on employability, nature of employment, and quality of social support system; ii. Decreased benefits: Affects child abuse/neglect through parental depression, increased tension and stress in HHs, and (possibly) increased substance abuse. May also increase work efforts leading to pathways above. Recipients may opt for marriage/cohabitation to boost HH income; resulting in new sources of positive or negative treatment of children; iii. Increased benefits: Effects found in the opposite direction from benefit reductions; iv. Improved parenting behavior: In case of required attendance of parenting classes. Could improve supervision and reduce corporal punishment. Some parents will choose not to cooperate, leading to sanctions and effects as above.
					Physical & emotional violence	Physical/ emotional abuse (substantiated)		Mean: 0.013 (T), 0.01 (C) (NS)	
						Physical/ emotional abuse (<1 year welfare/past 5 years)		Mean: 0.06 (T), 0.07 (C) (NS)	
						Physical/ emotional abuse (1-3 years welfare/past 5 years)		Mean: 0.015 (T), 0.009 (C) (NS)	
						Physical/ emotional abuse (4-5 years welfare/past 5 years)		Mean: 0.012 (T), 0.016 (C) (NS)	
						Physical/ emotional abuse (<12 years of school)		Mean: 0.010 (T), 0.015 (C) (NS)	
						Physical/ emotional abuse (≥12 years of school)		Mean: 0.015 (T), 0.009 (C) (NS)	
						Physical/ emotional abuse (previous report abuse/neglect)		Mean: 0.009 (T), 0.039 (C)***	
						Physical/ emotional abuse (no previous report abuse/neglect)		Mean: 0.013 (T), 0.007 (C)*	
						Physical/ emotional abuse (nonwhite)		Mean: 0.009 (T), 0.010 (C) (NS)	
						Physical/ emotional abuse (white)		Mean: 0.019 (T), 0.010 (C)*	
						Physical/ emotional abuse (youngest child aged <6)		Mean: 0.011 (T), 0.010 (C) (NS)	
						Physical/ emotional abuse (youngest child aged 6-18 years)		Mean: 0.017 (T), 0.009 (C) (NS)	
						Physical/ emotional abuse (adult head aged <25 years)		Mean: 0.012 (T), 0.015 (C) (NS)	
						Physical/ emotional abuse (adult head aged 25-34 years)		Mean: 0.013 (T), 0.010 (C) (NS)	
						Physical/ emotional abuse (adult head aged 35+ years)		Mean: 0.016 (T), 0.003 (C)*	
5	Bloom et al. (2000) [†]	Individual RCT (exp.)	Demographic data at BL (1994/96), state administrative records & primary data collection in Escambia County at 4-year follow-up (1998/99)	1,108 single-parents with a child aged 5-12 at follow-up (one RS per HH)	Violent discipline	Harsh-parenting (full sample) ²	1.6 [#]	OLS: 0.0 (NS)	Authors hypothesize two contrasting pathways: i. Increases in employment, through job satisfaction, may benefit HHs through increased regularity of home routines, improved maternal emotional well-being, and positive parenting practices; ii. Increases in hours of work may lead to higher levels of stress, or may negatively affect parental supervision.
						Harsh parenting (least at risk of welfare dependency)	1.7 [#]	OLS: -0.1 (NS)	
						Harsh parenting (medium risk)	1.6 [#]	OLS: 0.1	
						Harsh parenting (most at risk)	1.6 [#]	OLS: 0.0 (NS)	

APPENDIX A. OECD PAPERS (EVALUATION COMPONENTS) (continued)									
No	Authors	Study design	Data (years)	Sample (size)	Violence outcome	Measure(s)	BL Mean	Measure of effect(s)	Hypothesized mechanism
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
6	Beecroft et al. (2002)†	Individual RCT (exp.)	State administrative records and primary data collection with HH who entered Indiana's welfare reform program in its first year (05/1995 - 04/1996) at 5-year follow-up (2000)	1,679 single-parent families with a child aged 5-12 at follow-up (one RS per HH)	Violent discipline	Harsh parenting (full sample) ⁵	1.6 [#]	OLS: -0.1 (NS)	Authors hypothesize two contrasting pathways: i. If increased employment leads to higher HH income and/or improved mental health of mothers, the result might be improved parenting practices; ii. If increased maternal employment leads to greater stress balancing work and family demands, this could adversely affect parenting behavior and HH relationships.
						Harsh parenting (employed 0/5 quarters prior to RS)	1.5 [#]	OLS: 0.0 (NS)	
						Harsh parenting (employed 1-3/5 quarters prior to RS)	1.5 [#]	OLS: 0.0 (NS)	
						Harsh parenting (employed 4-5/5 quarters prior to RS)	1.6 [#]	OLS: -0.1**	
7	Huston et al. (2008)†	Individual RCT (exp.)	Demographic data at BL (1994/95), state administrative records & primary data collection in two areas in Milwaukee, Wisconsin at 8-year follow-up.	595 HHs with 866 focal children aged 9-19 at 8-year follow-up (≤2 children per HH)	Violent discipline	Effective child management (full sample) ⁶	3.89 [#]	OLS: 0.18***	Suggests that increased income and employment affects HH resources, parents' psychosocial well-being, and parent-child relationships (including harsh and non-supportive parenting).
						Effective child management (boys)	3.81 [#]	OLS: 0.25***	
						Effective child management (girls)	3.99 [#]	OLS: 0.08 (NS)	
						Effective child management (ages 9 to <13 at follow-up)	4.03 [#]	OLS: 0.07 (NS)	
						Effective child management (ages 9 to <13 at follow-up)	3.79 [#]	OLS: 0.24**	
8	Gennetian & Miller (2002)‡	Individual RCT (exp.)	Demographic data at BL, state administrative records at follow-up & primary data collection in three urban counties in Minnesota at three-year follow-up (1994 - 1997).	879 single-mother long-term ⁷ recipient families with focal child aged 5-12 at follow-up (one RS per HH)	Violent discipline	Harsh parenting (MFIP vs. AFDC) ²	1.7 [#]	OLS: 0.0 (NS)	Two primary pathways hypothesized (which may in turn have feedback effects): i. Resources: Access to material and nonmaterial resources; ii. Socialization: Family functioning, parenting practices, and the presence of role models.
						Harsh parenting (MFIP Incentives Only vs. AFDC)	1.7 [#]	OLS: -0.1 (NS)	
						Harsh parenting (MFIP vs. MFIP Incentives Only)	1.7 [#]	OLS: 0.1 (NS)	
9	Cancian et al. (2013)‡	Individual RCT (nat. exp.)	Child Support Demonstration Evaluation (CSDE) (1997/98) & the Wisconsin Statewide Automated Child Welfare Information System (WiSACWIS) ⁸	13,062 mothers of children aged 0-18 born out of wedlock who entered W-2 between 9/1997 & 6/1998 ⁹	Emotional, physical & sexual violence	Screened-in reports of abuse & neglect	0.20	OR: 0.881** (0.050)	Mechanisms proposed include: i) poverty may reduce parental ability to provide for a child's basic needs, ii) economic hardships may affect parental mental health, caregiving behaviors, and/or HH dynamics, iii) poverty may increase the visibility and scrutiny of low-income HHs to mandated maltreatment reporters, and iv) selection accounts for associations between income or poverty status and child maltreatment.
Notes: ‡ refers to peer-reviewed journal article; † refers to working paper or technical report; # refers to mean of control group at endline. Significance levels are: * p <0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.001									
Abbreviations: Study design (exp = experimental; nat. exp. = natural experiment; RCT = randomized control trial). Measure of effect(s) (OR = odds ratios; OLS = ordinary least squares; CI = confidence interval; NS = non-significant). Other: T = treatment; C= control; BL = baseline; HH = household; RS = randomly selected; ABC = A Better Chance Welfare Reform Program; ID = identification data.									
1	Using a 7-item scale developed for the National Longitudinal Survey of Children and Youth in Canada: i) forget rules, ii) nag about small things, iii) keep rules when suits myself, iv) get angry and yell, v) threaten punishment, vi) punish depending on mood, and vii) hit or threaten to hit, asked of parents of children aged 15-18, and of children aged 12-18.								
2	Number of times the mother i) spanked, ii) scolded, yelled, or threatened, or iii) got really angry at the focal child during the past week (items adapted from the HOME scale). Items recoded on a 4-point scale (1 = none of the time, 4 = all of the time) from which a mean score is calculated, with higher scores corresponding to harsher parenting.								
3	While the authors also report impacts in Year 1 and Year 2, we focus on impacts in Year 3 for all indicators, as results did not vary substantially.								
4	Control group subjected to traditional welfare (Aid to Families with Dependent Children) rules. Differences found in work requirements, time limits, parenting provisions, more generous financial and service supports. So that the source of difference is the welfare reform.								
5	Measures how often parents engaged in one of three harsh behaviors towards a child in the past week, namely scolding or yelling, getting angry and spanking. Items recoded across four levels (never, 1-6 times, 7 times, or ≥8 or more times). Overall score computes taking the average score across the three items; higher scores present greater harshness.								
6	Composite variable including i) high control (or few problems), ii) infrequent discipline or punishment, iii) low parenting stress, and iv) high confidence in the ability to prevent harm; with higher scores corresponding with better outcomes. Particularly, frequency of discipline considers 6-items assessing the frequency, in the prior week, with which parents punished the child by grounding, taking away privileges, and spanking. Tables included in the study present separate stats for problems with control and parenting								
7	On welfare for at least 24 of 36 months prior to random assignment.								
8	CSDE was used for measures of experimental status and other control variables; WiSACWIS was used for administrative data on screened-in child abuse or neglect reports.								
9	Mothers are tracked in the administrative data for a period of 2 years from the time that they entered W-2 and were assigned to the experimental or control group.								